Rationale, aims, and objectives Decision curve analysis (DCA) is a widely used method for evaluating diagnostic tests and predictive models. It was developed based on expected utility theory (EUT) and has been reformulated using expected regret theory (ERG). Under certain circumstances, these 2 formulations yield different results. Here we describe these situations and explain the variation.
| INTRODUCTION
Arguably, the threshold model represents one of the most important advances in clinical decision making. 1, 2 According to the threshold model when faced with uncertainty about whether to treat, order a test or apply a predictive model, or simply observe the patient, there exists some probability of disease or disease outcome (threshold), at which a physician is indifferent between administering versus not administering treatment, or acting according to test or predictive model. 1, 2 The threshold model reflects one of the fundamental principles of rational decision making: it is rational for a doctor to act (ie, order a diagnostic test, prescribe treatment) and for the patient to accept the proposed health intervention when one believes that benefits (gains) (B) of such action will outweigh its harms (losses) (H), ie, exceed threshold (T). 3, 4 threshold model has been reformulated in a number of ways, both within the framework of EUT and non-EUT theories (for a review, see Djulbegovic et al 4 ) . One such extension of the threshold model is decision curve analysis (DCA).
DCA is a widely used technique for evaluation of the value of diagnostic tests or predictive models over a range of all possible thresholds. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] The assessment of the threshold probability at which a decision maker is indifferent between failure to administer a beneficial, over committing to a potentially harmful health intervention, allows capturing patient preferences related to given management choices. 1,2,4 DCA incorporates the predictive model's accuracy, the consequences of a decision action, and a patient's preferences to assess the best course of action, such as making a decision according to the predictive model, treat all patients, or treat none. [5] [6] [7] One of the advantages of DCA is that we do not actually need to elicit the threshold from each patient, but instead model decisions about treatment over a range of thresholds without knowing details about specific utilities that determine threshold. 5, 6 DCA was originally formulated using EUT 5, 6 and reformulated within the expected regret theory (ERG) framework. 7, 11 In the EUT DCA, the best course of action is the one associated with the highest expected value, whereas in the ERG DCA, the best course of action is the decision that will lead to the least amount of regret. 7 We previously showed that ERG DCA and EUT DCA lead to the same decisions if treatment effects are not taken into consideration. 7 Note, however, that the original DCA did not explicitly model treatment effect on patient's outcomes. In this paper, we demonstrate that when treatment effects are included in the modeling, different results are generated by EUT and ERG DCA, which has important implications for medical decision making.
2 | METHODS 2.1 | Model structure Figure 1 displays a typical decision tree describing treatment options based on the results of a prediction model. q i represents the modelgenerated probability of the event of interest D (D+ event present, D− event absent), such as disease presence or occurrence of outcome in a patient i; p i is the actual probability of the event D+ for the patient
where N is the number of patients. RRR is the relative risk reduction expected from treatment Rx, U j is the utility associated with each outcome j, and T is a threshold probability at which a decision maker is indifferent between the "do not treat" (NoRx) and "treat" (Rx) strategies. We opt to model treatment effect as relative risk reduction (RRR), which is a convenient way to express a risk ratio (RR) as a proportion of risk (p i ) reduction according to 15, 16 
where RR is defined as the risk of event in the treatment group over the risk of event in control group. 16 The main advantage of using RRR as a measure of treatment effect over the treatment absolute differences is that the former remains constant over the range of predicted risks (p i ). [15] [16] [17] RRR is also easy Note that we use the term "predictive model" in generic sense to predict or foresee/foretell something that is yet unknown (such as outcome occurrence in individual patients). Typically, such models convert available information (predictors) into a statement about the probability about diagnosis or prognosis. 18, 19 The model shown in Figure 1 (and later in Figure 2 ) applies to both prognostic and diagnostic prediction as long as such a prediction is used to guide selection of treatment.
| Derivation of the EUT DCA
As an illustrative example, Figure 2a shows the decision tree of a 3-choice dilemma associated with hospice referral. In this case, a patient may decide to receive treatment targeting his underlying disease ("Treat All"), accept referral to hospice ("Treat None"), or act according to the threshold model based the patient's estimated probability of
Decision tree depicting use of a predictive model to guide treatment choices according to expected utility-based theory ("EUT utilities") and ERG (displayed as "Regret Utilities," ie, differences in values or utility of the outcomes of the action taken and the utility of the outcomes of another action, which, in retrospect, we should have taken [12] [13] [14] . As explained in the text, q i
represents the model-generated probability of disease outcome for a patient i, whereas p i is the actual probability of the event D (disease outcome) for the same patient. T, threshold probability for treatment; D+, disease is present; D−, disease is absent; RRR, relative risk reduction of treatment.
Regret is computed as the difference in utilities of the action taken and the action that, in retrospect, should have been taken death ("Model"). In Figure 2a , q i and p i represent the model estimated probability of death and the actual probability of death D+ for patient i respectively. RRR represents the relative risk reduction associated with treatment Rx, U j is the utility of outcome j, and T is the threshold probability at which a decision maker is indifferent between benefits and harms of treatment.
By solving the tree, we derive the expected value of the model as
As explained earlier, according to the threshold model, we treat if q i ≥ T. Therefore, the expected values of the "Treat none" and "Treat all" strategies can be computed by setting T = 1 and T = 0 in Equation 1, respectively. Thus,
The optimal strategy is the one that yields the higher net benefit (NB). Using the derived expected utilities, we calculate the NB of a strategy by subtracting the expected utility of this strategy (eg, "Treat all" or "Model") from the expected utility of the "Treat none" strategy. 5, 6 Thus,
To simplify Equation 2, we define the true positive rate for a given threshold T as
and False Positive rate for the given threshold T as
Thus,
By replacing T = 0 in Equation 2, we derive the NB of "Treat all"
To further simplify our notation, and following Pauker and Kassirer 1,2 and Vickers and Elkin, 5 we define the differences between utilities (preferences) related to the consequence of administering treatment when it would have been of benefit as B = U 1 − U 3 ; similarly, the preferences related to the consequences of being unnecessarily treated are denoted as harms H = U 4 − U 2 . Finally, even if appropriately
Decision tree depicting a typical 3-choice dilemma. a, Expected utility-based tree. b, expected regret-based tree. Three alternatives are shown: treat all patients, treat none, and use a predictive model/test to decide whether to treat or not. q i represents the model-generated probability of disease outcome for a patient i whereas p i is the actual probability of the event D+ (disease outcome) for the same patient. T, threshold probability for treatment; D−, disease is absent; RRR, relative risk reduction of treatment. Regret is computed as the difference in utilities of the action taken and the action that, in retrospect, should have been taken
given, there is no guarantee that only (D+) patients will receive treatment (see Figure 2) ; some patients with (D−) may also receive treatment. We defined this difference (Δ) between utilities of administering treatment as Δ = U 1 − U 2 . Note that all threshold models to date assumed that the differences in NB and harm between these utilities are positive (B ≥ 0 and H ≥ 0), which is a clinically sensible assumption. Although, in principle, that is possible, we do not consider the case of negative utilities or negative B or H in our threshold model.
With these substitutions, we can rewrite the formulas above as
The threshold probability, or the probability at which one is indifferent between deciding to treat versus not to treat, is computed as
Using the definitions for B , H , and Δ, above, we have
Note that if RRR = 0, T EUT reduces to the "classic" EUT Pauker and
Kassirer threshold 1, 2 :
B, H, and Δ can be further characterized in terms of disutilities, or using other popular evidence-based statistical measures. Although the original and widely used DCA did not take treatment effect into consideration, Vickers et al 10 did attempt to integrate treatment into EUT DCA by expressing the threshold as the absolute risk reduction between 2 treatments: ARD = p 0 − p t , where "p t represents the probability of event for patients receiving treatment and p 0 represents the probability of event in untreated patients". In our views, this creates several problems. First, ARD does vary with baseline risk, and it is preferable to model treatment effects using relative effects such as RRR that remain constant over the range of predicted risks (p i ). [15] [16] [17] Second, it may be better to express the threshold with respect to individual risk probabilities (p i ). In principle, that is possible by expressing p t = p 0 ⋅ (1 − RRR), which would, in turn, allow reformulation of threshold via p 0 . However, most importantly, the method described by Vickers et al 10 , assume that U1-U3 < 0. Although technically this is correct, clinically such a situation constitute an extremely rare case, particularly in the area of cancer treatment discussed by the authors.
Regardless if one wants to apply this EUT DCA model, its use per se is immaterial to the main objective of our paper, which is to contrast findings using EUT DCA with ERG DCA.
In further exposition, we do not consider all possible ways how the threshold equation can be expressed but focus on derivation of DCA, which is mainly done by scaling the original threshold formulas. As explained, our main intent here is to demonstrate differences between EUT-and ERG-derived DCA. Using the relationship expressed in Equation 4 , we can derive scaled NBs as
Note that if RRR = 0, these equations reduce to the Vickers and Elkin DCA equation (which uses "classic" T c ).
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DCA curves are generated by plotting NB of all 3 strategies (eg, "Treat all," "Treat none," and "Model") over all thresholds of interest. 
| Derivation of the ERG DCA
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Solving the tree in Figure 2b , we derive the expected regret associated with the prediction model as
Just like in EUT case, when the threshold is equal to zero, or one, we have
We derive the net expected regret difference (NERD) by calculating the expected regret of each choice (eg, "Treat All," "Model") and subtracting it from the expected regret of "Treat None." 7, 11, 22 NERD Model
Using the previously defined TP T and FP T , as well as B , H, and Δ, we can rewrite this as
, we derive the NERD of the "Treat all" strategy as
The threshold probability is computed as
Note that if RRR = 0, T ERG reduces to the "classic" EUT Pauker and
Kassirer (P&K) threshold T c 1,2 (see above).
Note that if RRR = 0, the equations above and below reduce to Vickers and Elkin DCA EUT equation (see also above).
5
3 | RESULTS
| EUT and ERG DCA generate different results
The major difference between EUT and ERG DCA arises because of the definition of the threshold probability when using the classical EUT and utilities expressed via ERG:
Both of these thresholds can be connected to the "classical" P&K EUT threshold via
Again, note that if RRR = 0, all these thresholds reduce to the "classic" P&K EUT threshold.
1,2
Extending the threshold model into DCA, we obtain the following:
Therefore,
Equations 5 and 7 show that EUT-based DCA and ERG-based DCA differ by threshold definitions (T EUT vs T ERG ) and the requirement for specifying Δ in the EUT model. As a result, noticeable differences in the evaluation of predictive models will be generated ( 
| DISCUSSION
In this paper, we demonstrate that when treatment effects are included in modeling, different results are generated by EUT and ERG DCA. Under these circumstances, EUT DCA cannot be used to model decisions over all preferences without further knowledge of the specific utilities related to differences between U1 and U2 (Δ). This, however, would defy the DCA's original purpose of analyzing decision strategies without requiring the elicitation of patients' preferences.
If the DCA method is to be used, ERG DCA seems to be preferable, which also has the following appeals: (1) it is a mathematically more parsimonious derivation of DCA derived within a coherent regret theory 7 ; (2) as a cognitive emotion, regret is widely recognized as one of the key decision making mechanisms enabling a decision maker to experience consequences of decisions both at the emotional (type 1) and cognitive (type 2) level 3, 24, 25 ; and (3) it is easily and reliably elicited using dual analog visual analog scale ("regret"-meter) 7 or similar scales. 7, 26 We should also note that the model we used here is for illustration purposes only-not to advocate the use of this particular model but only to illustrate differences when the model is used within 2 different theoretical frameworks.
Although we advocate using ERG DCA, we are aware of the long tradition of application of EUT in decision sciences, and of the unsettled debate about the superiority of 1 theory over the other. Our main point is that EUT and ERG versions of DCA do generate different results. Although, we cannot possibly settle here the question of superiority of EUT versus ERG (or other non-EUT theories), the larger point we are making is that the decision at which threshold to act closely relates to the question of rational choice. 3, 4 The "great rationality debate" has been prominent in nonmedical fields, 27, 28 but has only been sporadic in clinical medicine. By highlighting the differences in the results between ERG DCA versus EUT DCA-the latter being widely used method-we hope to stimulate a "rationality debate" in clinical medicine. The practical importance of advancing this debate can be appreciated if we, for example, note that some practice guidelines such as guidelines for colorectal screening are based on EUT-based modeling 29 ; conceivably, different recommendations could have been made if the non-EUT framework were used. Hence, we think that awareness of our findings is of importance to modelers, practicing physicians and policy makers.
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